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SPECIFIC INTENT MADE MORE SPECIFIC:
A CLARIFICATION OF
THE LAW OF ATTEMPTED MURDER IN ILLINOIS
-PEOPLE V. HARRIS
The essence of the crime of attempted murder is a specific intent to take
life. 1  This concept has undergone a subtle but significant change in Illinois
law. In a recent decision, the Illinois Supreme Court has sought to define
the precise mental element necessary to sustain a conviction of attempted
murder. In People v. Harris,2 the court held that "to convict for attempted
murder nothing less than a criminal intent to kill must be shown. "3 The
significance of this seemingly straightforward holding can be better ap-
preciated in light of prior Illinois decisions, many of which have sanctioned
attempted murder charges based on something less than intent to cause
death. 4
This Note will analyze the court's treatment of the sections of the Illinois
Criminal Code which define attempt and murder. 5  In particular, the opin-
ion will be discussed in light of prior conflicting case law. The Note will then
evaluate the court's reasons for adopting a position it had explicitly rejected
1. See, e.g., People v. Muir, 67 111. 2d 86, 91, 365 N.E. 2d 332, 335 (1977); People v.
Coolidge, 26 111. 2d 533, 536, 187 N.E.2d 694, 696 (1963); People v. Shields, 6 III. 2d 200, 205,
127 N.E.2d 440, 443 (1955); People v. Bashic, 306 II1. 341, 344, 137 N.E. 809, 811 (1922).
Some of these cases involve the crime of assault with intent to murder, the pre-1961 Criminal
Code equivalent of attepted murder. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 58-9 (1957) with ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 8-4, 9-1 (1977). Though there is a distinction between the two
offenses-an attempt may or may not involve an assault-both the old offense and its modern
counterpart require specific intent to kill.
2. 72 Ill. 2d 16, 377 N.E.2d 28 (1978).
3. Id. at 27, 377 N.E.2d at 33.
4. For example, in People v. Payton, 2 I11. App. 3d 693, 276 N.E.2d 775 (5th Dist. 1971),
a conviction of attempted murder was affirmed despite the defendant's protest that the indict-
ment was fatally defective for failure to allege his shooting was "knowingly committed with
intent to cause death or great bodily harm." Id. at 694, 276 N.E.2d at 776. The court stated
that the defendant, who shot at a man ostensibly to scare him, showed "a total disregard of
human life" such as to justify conviction. Id. at 697, 276 N.E.2d at 778. The court found a
"presumptive intent" to commit murder. Id., citing People v. Coolidge, 26 I11. 2d 533, 187
N.E.2d 694 (1963).
See also People v. Taylor, 56 I11. App. 2d 170, 205 N.E.2d 807 (1st Dist. 1965). The defend-
ant in that case was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of aggravated battery on the
same facts (shooting a girl at a party). The court affirmed, noting that aggravated battery re-
quired a lesser mental state than attempted murder. Then, in apparent contradiction of its
earlier statement that specific intent was the essence of attempted murder, the court observed:
"Yet willful and wanton conduct such as appears when one man fires several shots at another
with no apparent reason would seem to supply an adequate basis for a verdict of guilty of
attempted murder even though no specific intent were shown." 56 II1. App. 2d at 173, 205
N.E.2d 808-09 (emphasis added).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 8-4, 9-1 (1977). See notes 14 & 16 infra.
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in another recent opinion. 6  Finally, the probable effect of the decision on
future cases involving attempted murder will be considered.
THE REQUIREMENT OF INTENT
Generally, the offense of attempt requires an intent to commit a particular
offense and some act, other than mere preparation, toward commission of
that offense. 7 Illinois cases virtually always have recited that specific intent'
to kill or murder is an essential element of the crime of attempted murder.
The Harris requirement of a "criminal intent to kill" is, apparently, a differ-
ent label for the same concept. While the court did not expressly define
"criminal intent," it is probable the court meant "conscious objective or pur-
pose" rather than the less culpable mental states of knowledge or reckless-
ness.
9
6. See text accompanying notes 34-40 infra.
7. In Illinois the actus reus of an attempt is "any act which constitutes a substantial step
toward the commission of that offense." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4 (1977).
As the focus of this Note is on the intent requirement of attempted murder, a discussion of
acts constituting a "substantial step" will not be considered herein. For a survey of what consti-
tutes a sufficient overt act for attempted murder see Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 612 (1974), which
contains cases from various jurisdictions, including Illinois. See generally W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 59 (1972), [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE & SCOTT], for
a discussion of the principles of attempt liability. See also Enker, Mens Rea and Criminal At-
tempt, 1977 A.B.F. RES. J. 845; Marlin, Attempts and the Criminal Law: Three Problems, 8
OTTOWA L. REV. 518 (1976); Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempt, 70 HARV. 422 (1957);
Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts Reexamined-I, 1962 CRIM. L.R. 135.
8. "Specific intent" rather than "general intent" is required for a criminal attempt. The
distinction between the two terms has varied, causing considerable confusion in the law. Gen-
eral intent has been defined as "[an] intention, purpose, or design, either without specific plan
or particular object, or without reference to such plan or object." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
947 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). According to LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 7, at 202, "the most com-
mon usage of 'specific intent' is to designate a special mental element which is required above
and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime." In effect,
this means that while a murder may be committed without an actual intention to kill, an at-
tempted murder cannot be, since the purpose of the attempt is to cause the particular result
proscribed by the crime of murder. See Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, 114 S.E. 504
(1922). Accord, People v. Snyder, 15 Cal. 2d 706, 104 P.2d 639 (1940). Cf. People v. Hood, 1
Cal. 3d 444, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370 (1969) (assault defined as an attempt to commit a
violent act held to be a general intent crime). See generally Thompson & Gagne, The Confusing
Law of Criminal Intent in New Mexico, 5 NEW MEX. L. REV. 63 (1974), for an excellent
discussion of the problems involved in defining criminal intent.
9. The statutory definition of intent provides that "[a] person intends ... to accomplish a
result or engage in conduct . . . when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that
result or engage in that conduct." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-4 (1977) (emphasis added). See
also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (Committe Comments at 10) which state
in reference to the murder statute, subsection (1); " 'Intends' is used as defined in section 4-4:
'his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result, death or great bodily harm.'
This is the actual intent, resulting from a rational choice of action ....
Compare the definition of knowledge: "A person knows . .. [t]he result of his conduct, de-
scribed by the statute defining the offense, when he is consciously aware that such result is
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Initially, the court's holding may seem to merely restate the obvious. A
close look at Illinois case law, however, reveals that the courts often have
treated the specific intent requirement in a way which obscures the real
meaning of the requisite mental element involved in attempted murder. For
example, many Illinois opinions stated that specific intent can be "inferred
from the character of the assault, the use of a deadly weapon or other cir-
cumstances." 10  Usually that language was followed by the assertion that
"wanton and reckless disregard of human life" may be the equivalent of in-
tent." To complete the analysis, the following was mechanically recited:
Since every sane man is presumed to intend all the natural and probable
consequences flowing from his own deliberate act, it follows that if one
willfully does an act the direct and natural tendency of which is to destroy
another's life, the natural and irresistible conclusion, in the absence of qual-
ifying facts, is that the destruction of such other person's life was in-
tended. 12
These concepts may be appropriate in a case in which death has actually
resulted, since general intent is all that is required for murder. 13 It is ques-
tionable, however, to use this approach to explain the mental element re-
quired for attempted murder. The effect of the constant reiteration of such
practically certain to be caused by his conduct." ILL. REV. STAT. ch 38, § 4-5(b) (1977) (em-
phasis added).
Intending to kill (conscious purpose) and knowing to a practical certainty that one's acts will
cause death (conscious awareness) are "substantially equivalent as to culpabiltiy." ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (Committee Comments at 10) Thus, either of the above
two mental states suffice for the first subsection of the murder statute. See note 14 infra. How-
ever, the second subsection of the murder statute, § 9-1(a)(2), knowing one's acts create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm is distinguishable from knowing one's acts will cause
death of great bodily harm. The difference lies in the lesser degree of danger in the second
situation. As a practical matter, this difference will be reflected in the penalties. Committee
Comments, supra.
From the above discussion of mental states applicable to the murder statute the inference
may be drawn that "conscious purpose" is subjective intent and "conscious awareness" is objec-
tive intent. See notes 50 and 55 infra. As stated in the Committee Comments, supra, the two
mental states are equivalent. Though the Harris court did not further define criminal intent to
kill, it is probable that either "subjective intent" or "objective intent" will satisfy the mens rea
of attempted murder. This mental state, however, should be distinguished from "[knowing
one's] acts create a strong probability of death" under § 9-1(a)(2).
10. E.g., People v. Koshiol, 45 I11. 2d 573, 578, 262 N.E.2d 446, 449 (1970); People v.
Coolidge, 26 I11. 2d 533, 536, 187 N.E.2d 694, 696 (1963); People v. Smith, 71 111. App. 2d 446,
454, 219 N.E.2d 82, 87 (1st Dist. 1966). See also Annot, 54 A.L.R. 3d 612, 629 (1974).
11. See, e.g., People v. Coolidge, 26 I11. 2d 533, 537, 187 N.E.2d 694, 697 (1963).
12. Id. Coolidge is only one of the large number of cases which repeat this language. For a
collection of Illinois ca es which allow inferred or presumed intent to support a finding of
specific intent for attempted murder, see Annot., 54 A.L.R 2d 612, 629 (1974). The presump-
tion language was used as recently as the supreme court's decision in People v. Muir, 67 I11. 2d
86, 365 N.E.2d 332 (1977), overruled in part by the instant case. See note 50 and accompanying
text infra.
13. See note 8 supra and note 51 infra.
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language in Illinois opinions has been the dilution of the intent requirement
of attempted murder.
Much of the resulting confusion has been caused by the statutory defini-
tion of murder. 14  Since attempt is an inchoate offense, it must be analyzed
in terms of the principal crime to which it relates. The murder statute allows
different mental states to suffice for a conviction of murder.15 The question,
then, becomes: which of these mental states are permissible when the crime
is an attempt1 6 to commit murder? It is this question that the court in Har-
ris finally settled.
THE HARRIS DECISION
In a consolidated appeal 17 the court invalidated attempted murder jury
instructions which did not require a criminal intent to kill.' 8 At the trial
level in both cases, People v. Harris and People v. Shields, the defendants
were charged with attempted murder. The issue common to both appeals
was the propriety of instructions' 9 based on the statutory definition of mur-
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a) (1977) defines murder:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if, in
performing the acts which cause the death:
(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another,
or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm to that individual or another; or
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than voluntary man-
slaughter.
15. ILLINOIS PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS-Criminal § 7.01 (1968) is adapted from ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a) and lists four subsections for use in a murder instruction, which may be
paraphrased as follows:
(1) intent to kill or do great bodily harm, or
(2) knowlege that one's acts will cause death, or
(3) knowledge that one's acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm, or
(4) an attempt to commit or a commission of a forcible felony.
Subsections (1) and (2) are based on § 9-1(a)(1). Subsections (3) and (4) correspond to § 9-1(a)(2)
and § 9-1(a)(3), respectively.
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-1(a) (1977) defines attempt:
A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he
does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that
offense.
17. People v. Harris, 43 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 364 N.E.2d 122 (4th Dist. 1977) (order under
Supreme Court Rule 23); People v. Shields, 54 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 370 N.E.2d 654 (3d Dist.
1977).
18. 72 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 377 N.E.2d 28, 33 (1978).
19. 72 11. 2d at 18, 377 N.E.2d at 29. While the sufficiency of the indictments was not
directly in issue in Harris, the rationale of requiring jury instructions to charge intent to kill
applies with equal force to indictments. Also, the court implicitly approves the application of its
holding to attempted murder indictments by reference to a previous case in which the court
"correctly held that both the indictment and the instructions were defective in that they permit-
ted the jury to find the defendant guilty of attempted murder if concluded that the defendant
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der. In Shields,20 one of the challenged instructions incorporated Section
9-1(a)(2) of the Illinois murder statute, which provides that a person commits
murder "if, in performing the acts which cause the death, he knows that such
acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm."-2 1  In Har-
ris,22 one of the instructions was based on Section 9-1(a)(1), which provides
knew that his acts created a strong probability of great bodily harm to another person even if
the evidence did not show that the defendant had acted with an intent to kill." 72 III. 2d at 26,
377 N.E.2d at 33, referring to People v. Trinkle, 68 I11. 2d 198, 369 N.E.2d 888 (1977) (em-
phasis added). Throughout this Note, therefore, references to indictments are assumed to be
included in the court's reasoning with respect to jury instructions.
20. Shields was indicted for aggravated battery and attempted murder because of a shooting
which took place after a fight between the defendant and his neighbor. Apparently, what had
begun as a social visit developed into a brawl. The neighbor, highly intoxicated, caused a com-
motion in the defendant's apartment and damaged a table. Finally, his mother and sister were
able to remove him from the defendant's apartment. Shortly thereafter, the defendant took his
rifle over to the neighbor's apartment and threatened the man. At some point, the defendant's
rifle discharged, injuring the neighbor's mother.
At the trial, the jury was instructed on the elements of attempted murder and aggravated
battery. The jury found the defendant guilty on both counts. The court entered a judgment
solely on the attempted murder charge because in Illinois, aggravated battery is an "included
offense" of the crime of attempted murder. Included offenses are ones which are "established
by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable mental state (or both), than
that which is required to establish the commission of the crime charged." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 2-9 (1977). A defendant cannot be sentenced on both offenses arising out of the same facts,
because the lesser crime is considered to merge into the greater crime.
21. 72 Ill. 2d at 22, 377 N.E.2d at 31. The Shields instructions defining the offense of
attempted murder were drafted as follows,
A person commits the crime of attempt who, with intent to commit murder, does
any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of
murder ....
ILLINOIS PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS-Criminal § 6.05 (1968) (general attempt instruction).
To sustain the charge of attempt, the State must prove the following propositions:
(1) That the defendant performed an act which constituted a substantial step toward
the commission of the crime of murder; and
(2) That the defendant did so with the intent to commit the crime of murder.
ILLINOIS PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS-Criminal § 6.07 (1968) ("issue" instruction).
A person commits the crime of murder who kills an individual if, in performing the
acts which cause the death, he knows that such acts create a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to that individual.
ILLINOIS PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS-Criminal § 7.01 (1968) (alternative subsection 3) See note
15 supra. Use of pattern instructions in Illinois is required whenever applicable unless the court
determines that an instruction does not accurately state the law. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A,
§ 451 (1977).
22. In the lower court Harris was charged with attempting to murder a woman during a
quarrel in which he accused her of infidelity. The shooting occurred when the woman tried to
escape from the defendant in her automobile, after a prolonged argument. The defendant had a
gun and evidently shot at the automobile as it drove away. Although there were no eye wit-
nesses to the occurrence, police testified at the trial that they found the defendant near the scene of
the incident. They also found a bullet fragment on the back seat of the car. On these facts the
defendant was convicted of attempted murder.
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that a person commits murder "if, in performing the acts which cause the
death, he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm." The supreme court
found that both instructions were susceptible to the interpretation by a jury
that a person could be found guilty of attempted murder even if he did not
actually intend to cause death. 23  The instructions, therefore, were deemed
erroneous.
CONTRADICTORY OPINIONS
Three times in less than twelve months the Illinois Supreme Court con-
fronted the same issue: 24 whether any mental state other than actual intent
to kill may be set out in indictments or instructions pertaining to an attemp-
ted murder prosecution. By deciding that issue in the negative the court
resolved a troublesome question of law and attained a fair and logical result.
Much uncertainty had been created by the supreme court's prior inconsis-
tent opinions 25 and the contradictory decisions of some of the state's appel-
late courts. 26
The Harris court realized that the chief problem concerning the instruc-
tions in both appeals was that the offense of attempted murder was defined
in the exact terms of the murder statute. 27  An instruction giving the statu-
tory definition of attempt coupled with one giving the statutory definition of
murder would seem to define exactly the crime of attempted murder. 2 8
However, since Section 9-1(a) contains alternative definitions, some of which
will sustain a murder conviction absent an actual intention to kill, the court
found it erroneous to base indictments or instructions on Section 9-1(a) in its
entirety. 29  To illustrate this point the court cited People v. Viser,30 a deci-
23. 72 Ill. 2d at 27, 377 N.E.2d at 33.
24. The other supreme court cases involving this issue are People v. Muir, 67 Ill. 2d 86,
365 N.E.2d 332 (1977), and People v. Trinkle, 68 Ill. 2d 198, 369 N.E.2d 888 (1977). See text
and accompanying notes 34-45 infra.
25. Compare People v. Muir, 67 Ill. 2d 568, 343 N.E.2d 903 (1977) and People v. Koshiol,
45 Ill. 2d 573, 262 N.E.2d 446 (1970) with People v. Trinkle, 68 Ill. 2d 198, 369 N.E.2d 888
(1977) and People v. Viser, 62 I11. 2d 568, 343 N.E.2d 903 (1975).
26. Compare People v. Payton, 2 Ill. App. 3d 693, 276 N.E.2d 775 (5th Dist. 1971) and
People v. Taylor, 56 Il. App. 2d 170, 205 N.E.2d 807 (1st Dist. 1965) with People v. Trinkle,
40 Ill. App. 3d 730, 353 N.E.2d 18 (4th Dist. 1976), aff'd 68 I11. 2d 198, 369 N.E.2d 888 (1977)
and People v. Muir, 38 I11. App. 3d 1051, 349 N.E.2d 423 (2d Dist. 1976), rev'd, 67 Ill. 2d 86,
365 N.E.2d 332 (1977). See also Doherty, The Strange Fate of Two Men Named David: The
Need for Symmetry in the Criminal Law, 66 ILL. B.J. 518 (1978), which traces the irregular
routes of Trinkle and Muir through the appellate and supreme courts.
27. 72 I11. 2d at 23, 24, 377 N.E.2d at 31. See notes 14 & 15 supra.
28. See note 21 supra.
29. 72 I11. 2d at 24, 377 N.E.2d at 31. The court cited People v. Koshiol, 45 I11. 2d 573, 262
N.E.2d 447 (1970), for the proposition that "in a trial for attempted murder it is not error to
give an instruction defining the elements of murder." 72 I11. 2d at 24, 377 N.E.2d at 31. Of
course, it would not make sense to instruct a jury on attempt in the abstract without reference
to the specific offense attempted. The point the court is making is that in attempted murder
cases the literal language of the murder statute cannot be used in toto.
30. 62 i11. 2d 568, 343 N.E.2d 903 (1975).
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sion in which the court had recognized that an attempted murder charge
could not be based on Section 9-1(a)(3) of the murder statute, which defines
felony murder. 31 The Viser court struck down the felony murder instruc-
tion because "attempt requires 'an intent to commit a specific offense'...
while the distinctive characteristic of felony murder is that it does not in-
volve an intention to kill. There is no such criminal offense as an attempt to
achieve an unintended result."
3 2
The supreme court had a chance to extend the Viser rationale to instruc-
tions based on Section 9-1(a)(2) 33 in People v. Muir.34 The defendant,
Muir, had been convicted of attempted murder for firing a gun at a police
officer. 35  The appellate court reversed Muir's conviction on grounds that
the indictment and instructions were erroneous, as they required only a
showing that the defendant had acted with knowledge of the probability of
death or great bodily harm rather than actual intent to kill. 36  The supreme
court, however, reversed the appellate court and held that the instruction
was proper. The court went on to state that specific intent to kill could be
inferred from the circumstances of the defendant's actions since everyone is
presumed to intend the probable consequences of his voluntary acts.
3 7  It
then concluded that "the law in this area is well established in this State." 38
Four months after the Muir pronouncement the supreme court, in People
v. Trinkle, 39 held that the mental state of knowing that one's actions
created a strong probability of great bodily harm was insufficient to sustain
an attempted murder conviction. The court thus abruptly changed its posi-
tion, without mentioning the contrary holding and rationale of Muir.
4 0
31. "A person who kills an individual ... commits murder if, in performing the acts which
cause the death .. .he is attempting or committing a forcible felony .... ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 9-1(a)(3) (1977).
32. People v. Viser, 62 I11. 2d 568, 581, 343 N.E.2d 903, 910 (1975).
33. See note 21 supra. The Muir instructions were the same as those set forth in Shields.
34. 67 I11. 2d 86, 365 N.E.2d 332 (1977).
35. The gun failed to discharge but the evidence showed that two cartridges were jammed
in the barrel. 67 I11. 2d at 89-90, 365 N.E.2d at 334.
36. People v. Muir, 38 11. App. 3d 1051, 1057-58, 349 N.E.2d 423, 429-30 (2d Dist. 1976).
37. People v. Muir, 67 III. 2d 86, 92, 365 N.E.2d 332, 335 (1977) (two justices dissenting).
The appellate court's opinion was adopted by Supreme Court Justices Moran and Goldenhersh
as their dissent from the majority opinion. Id. at 96, 365 N.E.2d at 335. Compare Justice Ryan's
dissenting opinion in Harris, note 52 infra.
38. 67 Ill. 2d at 91, 365 N.E.2d at 335.
39. 68 I11. 2d 198, 369 N.E.2d 888 (1977).
40. The Trinkle court's failure to mention Muir's holding is inexplicable, especially in view
of the short period of time separating the two decisions. It should be noted, however, that the
fact situations in the two cases were quite different. In Muir, the defendant pointed a gun
directly at a police officer and pulled the trigger. In Trinkle, a drunken man shot at a building
and inadvertently hit a man standing behind the door of the building. It is possible that the
indictment and instructions in Muir were upheld in part because the defendant's intent to kill
the policeman seemed highly likely; therefore, there would be less danger that a jury might find
the defendant guilty without an intent to kill.
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The Harris holding is actually an affirmation and extension of the Trinkle
opinion. In Trinkle, the defendant was refused further service at a tavern
after drinking there all day. Threatening to "shoot or blow tip the bar," he
left, bought a gun and returned to the street outside of the tavern. There he
shot at the building and injured a customer who, unknown to Trinkle, had been
standing behind the door. The trial court found the defendant guilty of at-
tempted murder. On appeal, the court reduced the offense from attempted
murder to aggravated battery. 4 1 The court held that since specific intent to
kill was necessary to support the conviction of attempted murder, inclusion
of the words "great bodily harm" in the indictment and jury instructions
created an impermissible inference that the jury could find Trinkle guilty of
attempted murder solely for inflicting great bodily harm. 42  Since the effect
of such an instruction would be to permit an attempted murder conviction to
be based on proof of the same elements as aggravated battery, 43 a lesser
offense requiring a less culpable mental state, the appellate court concluded
that the indictment and instructions were fatally defective. 44  The supreme
court agreed. 45
The decision in larris follows logically from Trinkle. In fact, it appears to
be mandated by the Trinkle holding. Regarding the consolidated appeals
before it, the court found the instructions in People v. Shields to be identical
to the defective instruction in Trinkle.46 As the jury instruction approved in
Muir was also the same, the court expressly overruled that part of the Muir
holding which upheld the indictment and instructions based on Section
9-1(a)(2).4 7  By extension, the court struck down the instruction involved in
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlOA § 615(b)(3) (1977) gives courts of review the power, in limited
situations, to reduce the degree of an offense.
42. People v. Trinkle, 40 Ill. App. 3d 730, 353 N.E.2d 18 (4th Dist. 1976), aff'd, 68 I11. 2d
198, 369 N.E.2d 888 (1977). The appellate court in Trinkle found the evidence against the
defendant insufficient to support a conviction of attempted murder because his acts were di-
rected against property and not against a person. Since a man was injured by the shooting, the
proper charge to be placed against the defendant was aggravated battery, which does not re-
quire the intent to kill. See note 43 infra.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-4(a) (1977) defines aggravated battery: "A person who, in
committing a battery, intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, or permanent disabil-
ity or disfigurement commits aggravated battery ....
A person who, in committing a battery uses a deadly weapon ... commits aggravated bat-
tery.
44. 40 Ill. App. 3d at 734, 353 N.E.2d at 22.
45. People v. Trinkle, 68 Ill. 2d 198, 369 N.E.2d 888 (1977). By requiring the indictment
and instructions to charge a specific intent to commit the specific offense (to kill), the court
primarily sought to keep distinct the crimes of aggravated battery and attempted murder. The
possibility that a defendant could be convicted of attempted murder for committing aggravated
battery concerned the court largely because of the difference in penalties for the two crimes.
The greater severity of the attempted murder penalty, according to the court, "puts in focus the
materiality of the mental state of the accused." Id. at 202, 369 N.E.2d at 890. See notes 56-64
and accompanying text infra.
46. 72 Ii. 2d at 27, 377 N.E.2d at 33. See note 21 supra.
47. 72 I11. 2d at 27, 377 N.E.2d at 33.
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People v. Harris, which was based on Section 9-1(a)(1).4 Thus, as a result
of the Harris holding, the use of attempted murder indictments and jury
instructions containing the words "or cause great bodily harm" will hence-
forth constitute reversible error.
ANALYSIS
Because the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a new rule of law in Harris,
it should have given a more complete discussion of previous cases. No men-
tion was made of the many opinions in which the courts recited the incanta-
tion that "every sane man is presumed to intend all the natural and probable
consequences flowing from his own deliberate act ...... 49 Especially in
need of consideration was the Muir court's express rejection of those au-
thorities which criticize the use of the presumed intent language in the con-
text of proving specific intent. 50 Instead of offering a thoughtful evaluation
of its change in viewpoint, the court cited a passage from a criminal law
treatise 51 to support its decision. The court's failure to explain its switch in
48. Because of the magnitude of potential harm caused by the erroneous instruction, the
court rejected the State's argument that IHarris' failure to renew his objection in his post-trial
motion operated as a waiver of his rights. 72 111. 2d at 28, 377 N.E.2d at 33, 34. The court
invoked the "plain error" doctrine, stating that "substantial defects (regarding jury instructions)
are not waived by a failure to make objections thereto if the interests of justice require." Id. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 451(c) (1977).
49. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
50. E.g., LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 7, at 203; R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, ch. 6 at 575
(2d ed. 1969). See State v. Lanahan, 12 Ariz. App. 446, 471 P. 2d 748 (1970); People v. Snyder,
15 Cal. 2d 706, 104 P.2d 639 (1940); Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, 114 S.E. 504
(1922).
Apparently, the Muir court advocated an objective standard to infer intent from the danger-
ousness of the defendant's actions as opposed to one based on the defendant's conscious purpose
to cause death. While a jury might well infer the intent to commit murder from either standard,
it would seem preferable for a court to omit any reference to legal preferences or presumptions
and let the jury decide on the basis of all the evidence. See notes 54 and 55 infra.
51. The court stated that:
[o]bservations of LaFave & Scott (Criminal Law sec. 59, at 428-29 (1972)) are
representative of authority that it is not sufficient to prove attempted murder to
show that the accused intended to cause serious bodily harm. "Some crimes, such
as murder, are defined in terms of acts causing a particular result plus some mental
state which need not be an intent to bring about that result. Thus, if A, B, and C
have each taken the life of another, A acting with intent to kill, B with an intent to
do serious bodily harm, and C with a reckless disregard of human life, all three are
guilty of murder because the crime of murder is defined in such a way that any one
of these mental states will suffice. However, if the victims do not die from their
injuries, then only A is guilty of attempted murder; on a charge of attempted mur-
der it is not sufficient to show that the defendant intended to do serious bodily
harm or that he acted in reckless disregard for human life. Again, this is because
intent is needed for the crime of attempt, so that attempted murder requires an
intent to bring about that result described by the crime of murder (i.e., the death
of another)."
72 111. 2d at 27, 28, 377 N.E.2d at 33.
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position loses importance, however, because the logic of the new rule is
readily apparent. 52
Of greater significance, perhaps, is the fact that the court did not promul-
gate guidelines regarding the acts or circumstances which may give rise to
an inference of an accused's intent to kill. The court did not repeat the once
seemingly axiomatic words that "specific intent can be inferred from the
character of the assault, the use of a deadly weapon and other cir-
cumstances. '53  Whether or not this omission was deliberate, it was proba-
bly salutory. Had the court set out guidelines to determine intent, future
attempted murder decisions might elevate those suggestions to the status of
presumptions, a possibility well-illustrated by the number of cases using
the presumed intent language. 54 By refusing to elaborate on which factors
52. But see the dissent in People v. Harris, 72 I11. 2d 16, 29-35, 377 N.E.2d 28, 34-37
(1978) (Ryan, J., dissenting in part). As the author of the Muir decision, Justice Ryan sought to
clarify his earlier opinion. According to him, the indictments and instructions in Muir and
Trinkle were distinguishable and therefore not inconsistent. Basically, his point was that instruc-
tions must be read together as a series and, if on the whole, they fairly state the law, the
instructions are sufficient. In Muir, he stated, the issue instruction to the jury included the
requirement that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with
intent to commit murder in addition to the instruction based on § 9-1(a)(2), which used the
"knowledge of great bodily harm" language to describe the defendant's criminal actions. Trinkle,
on the other hand, involved an issue instruction framed in such a way that the State need only
prove the defendant acted with knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm, without the reference to "intent to murder." The fact that the instructions in
both cases went on to define murder in the terms of § 9-1(a)(2) did not alter Justice Ryan's
defense of the validity of the Muir holding, even though he agreed with the majority in Harris
that the great bodily harm language should be excised from the Harris instruction based on §
9-1(a)(1). Ryan's argument is unduly confusing and technical, compared with the much simpler
solution of the majority to require intent to kill only.
A reading of earlier cases indicates that, traditionally, indictments and instructions have not
been challenged on the basis of the statutory construction of the offense of attempted murder.
Instead, appeals in attempted murder cases have been based on grounds such as insufficiency of
the evidence, see, e.g., People v. Henry 3 I11. App. 3d 235, 278 N.E.2d 547 (1st Dist. 1971)
(evidence held insufficient to establish defendant's "wanton and reckless disregard" for human
life from which intent to kill could be inferred), or failure of the indictment to adequately allege
the particular acts constituting the charge, see, e.g., People v. Mass, 31 111. App. 3d 759, 334
N.E.2d 452 (2d Dist. 1975) (information charging the defendant with "intent to kill and murder"
held sufficient to inform defendant of the charges against him).
53. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
54. See notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra. The term "presumption" may be mislead-
ing as used in the cited cases. A true presumption has procedural effects, requiring an accused
to produce evidence to rebut the presumption. It is likely that the language that one is "pre-
sumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts" is actually a permissible inference for the
fact-finder. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 9, at 203.
It is doubtful that a true presumption of intent in attempted murder cases would be constitu-
tionally valid. See State v. Odom, 83 Wash. 2d 541, 520 P.2d 152 (1974), cert. den. 419 U.S.
1013 (1974), in which the Supreme Court of Washington struck down a statutory presumption
that a defendant's possession of an unlicensed pistol was prima facie evidence of intent to com-
mit a violent crime. The court held the statute to be unconstitutional since it deprived the
defendant of the presumption of innocence.
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may properly be used to infer a criminal intent to kill, then, the court allows
for case-by-case jury determination of the existence of intent to kill. 55 This
in turn reaffirms the proper balance of roles between the judge as the in-
terpreter of the law and the jury as finder of fact.
Most importantly, Harris clarifies a formerly confused area of the criminal
law in Illinois by limiting attempted murder jury instructions to intent to
kill. This is fair to defendants and imposes no major additional burden upon
prosecutors. Theoretically, at least, attempted murder will be sharply distin-
guished from lesser included offenses 56 such as aggravated battery, 5 7 aggra-
vated assault 5 8 or reckless conduct.59  As discussed above, if a conviction for
attempted murder could be sustained on grounds that the defendant acted
with the intent to cause great bodily harm or with knowledge that his actions
would probably cause such harm, there would be no practical distinction
between attempted murder and aggravated battery.
Clearly, the legislature did not intend the commingling of separate of-
fenses. 60  In fact, one of the purposes of the drafters of the Criminal Code
Regarding the propriety of presumptive language in a jury instruction, the supreme court of
Wyoming held that such language had the effect of precluding a jury from finding guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Steubgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1976). But cf. State v. McCarter, 36
Wis. 2d 608, 153 N.W.2d 527 (1967) (Wisconsin rule applicable in all criminal cases, including
those in which specific intent is an element of the offense, is that "all sane men are pre-
sumed to intend . . ."). See generally Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due
Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969).
55. The court's failure to elaborate on what constitutes permissible inferences of criminal
intent to kill, however, may give rise to the question of whether objective or subjective
criteria should be used. See note 50 supra. Though the distinction between the two standards is
not clear, generally the objective viewpoint looks to the dangerousness of the actor's conduct
and other circumstances while the subjective viewpoint focuses on the actor's state of mind. See
generally MODEL PENAL CODE 501.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
It seems that the distinction between the two standards is artificial and irrelevant to a large
extent, as under either standard the jury will have to infer intent from the actor's conduct and
other circumstances. By focusing on the purpose or disposition of the actor, however, courts
may avoid diluting the attempt law by eliminating the presumed intent language.
56. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-9 (1977).
57. A person commits aggravated battery who "intentionally or knowingly causes great bod-
ily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement . . ." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-4 (1977).
Aggravated battery is a Class 3 felony. Id. See also note 64 infra.
58. "A person commits an assault . . . he engages in conduct which places another in
reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-1(a) (1977).
"A person commits an aggravated assault, when, in committing an assault, he: (1) Uses a
deadly weapon ... " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-2 (1977). Aggravated assault is a Class A
misdemeanor. Id. See also note 64 infra.
59. "A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of an individual . . .
by any means, commits reckless conduct if he performs recklessly the acts which cause the
harm ... " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-5(a) (1977). Reckless conduct is a Class A mis-
demeanor. Id. See also note 64 infra.
60. The appellate court in Muir recognized this. See People v. Muir, 38 I11. App. 3d 1051,
1057, 349 N.E.2d 423, 429 (1976).
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of 1961 was to eliminate overlapping and inconsistent criminal provisions."'
Limiting the mental state for attempted murder to intent to kill is consonant
with this legislative policy. In addition to revising the categories of substan-
tive offenses the legislature re-drafted sentencing provisions 62 to coordinate
the seriousness of the crime with the severity of the sanction.6 3 The Harris
holding vindicates this legislative scheme by ensuring that a person accused
of attempted murder will not be given the harsher attempted murder pen-
alty if the evidence fairly shows him guilty only of a lesser offense. 64
From the prosecutor's perspective, however, Harris may be viewed as an
obstacle to obtaining penalties commensurate to the gravity of criminal con-
duct in some situations. The facts of Harris provide an example.6 5  The
basis of the attempted murder charge against Harris was that he had shot at
a woman as she drove away from him, following a quarrel. There were no
witnesses to the occurrence. Aside from the woman's testimony, the only
evidence offered was policy testimony that a bullet had been found in the
back seat of the woman's car and that the glass in the rear window was
broken. Also, police stated that the defendant was arrested near the scene of
the incident.
Because the supreme court remanded the case, Harris has been granted a
new trial. 66  The jury in that trial, of course, will be instructed on the ele-
61. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (Committee Comments at 502).
Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Code of 1961, attempts were mixed with assaults, with
batteries and with aggravated batteries. Accordingly, "this indiscriminate mixture tended to
blend and confuse the traditional, and often times desirable distinctions between those of-
fenses. " Id.
62. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-1-1-1005-9-1 (1977).
63. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1001-1-2 (1977). See also Pusateri & Scott, Illinois' New
Unified Code of Corrections, 61 ILL. B.J. 62 (1972), which states that the purpose of classifying
offenses into graded categories for sentencing purposes is to create an ordered system of of-
fenses by seriousness and to simplify the sentencing choices of judges. Id. at 69. The ultimate
purpose of the Code is to eliminate disparity of sentencing and to produce more even-handed
justice. Id. Recent amendments to the Code of Corrections have added Class X, a new classifi-
cation of felonies. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-1 (Supp. 1977).
64. There are substantial differences in the penalties prescribed for attempted murder and
aggravated battery, aggravated assault and reckless conduct. The maximum sentence for attemp-
ted murder is that of a Class X felony. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4(c)(1) (Supp. 1977). Class X
felonies are punishable by a prison term of not less than six years and not more than 30 years.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(3) (Supp. 1977). Aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony, carries
a 2-5 year sentence. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(6) (Supp. 1977). Aggravated assault and
reckless conduct are Class A misdemeanors, which carry a one year maximum term of impris-
onment. Note that felony prison terms may be extended beyond the sentences provided in §
1005-8-1 when aggravating factors are present. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-2 (Supp. 1977).
There is no comparable provision regarding misdemeanor sentences. Thus, conceivably, the
attempted murder (Class X felony) sentence could be raised to a term of 30-60 years. Id.
65. People v. Harris, 48 II. App. 3d 1074, 370 N.E.2d 315 (4th Dist. 1977) (order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). There is no reported opinion of the appellate court, so the facts given
in the text are taken from the supreme court's opinion in People v. Harris, 72 Ill. 2d 16, 377
N.E.2d 28 (1978).
66. 72 I11. 2d at 28, 377 N.E.2d at 34.
(Vol. 28:1
PEOPLE V. HARRIS
ments of attempted murder without the great bodily harm language. The
prosecutor may fear that the evidence against Harris is insufficient to prove
actual intent to kill. Moreover, since the woman was not injured, aggravated
battery is inapplicable. Initially, it may appear that the only other charges
which may be brought against the defendant are aggravated assault or reck-
less conduct, both of which are misdemeanors. 6 7  Yet, Harris' conduct cer-
tainly created a grave risk of harm. The prosecutor then, may perceive a gap
in the continuum of criminal conduct and appropriate sanctions.
One solution may be to use the flexibility of the Criminal Code's Section
8-4 and charge attempted aggravated battery.68 This offense differs from
aggravated assault in that the victim need not be placed in apprehension of a
battery. 69 Instead, the emphasis is on the perpetrator's conduct and mental
state.
The potential sanctions for attempted aggravated battery are greater than
those for aggravated assault. 70 This charge would be available to fill the gap
between attempted murder and aggravated assault or reckless conduct. Of
course, the attempted aggravated battery conviction could be sustained only
if the circumstances were such that a jury could reasonably infer that the
defendant had a "criminal intent" to cause an aggravated battery.
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that the number of convictions for
attempted murder will decrease greatly. To be sure, in some cases, pro-
secutors may wish to seek indictments for attempted aggravated battery
rather than attempted murder. In cases involving extreme fact patterns,7 1
67. See notes 58, 59 and 64 supra.
68. There appears to be no barrier to charging such an offense. In fact, there is a suggestion
of legislative approval to such an offense:
"It is the intent of sections 8-4 (Attempt) and 12-1 (Assault) to identify attempted batteries
as attempts, governed by the same rules that govern all attempts, and conduct which . . . places
another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery as an assault." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 12-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (Committee Comments at 503).
69. Compare notes 57 and 58 supra.
70. See note 64 supra. Sentences for aggravated assault are limited to one year by the
classification of the offense as a misdemeanor. Under the sentencing provisions of the attempt
statute, it is clear that a sentence for attempted aggravated battery cannot exceed that of a Class
4 felony which carries a three year maximum. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4(c)(5); § 12-4(d);
§ 1005-8-1 (Supp. 1977). It appears that a prosecutor may seek imposition of a harsher term
than those set out in other code provisions, if aggravating factors are present. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2 (Supp. 1977). Under the facts surrounding Harris' conduct, the prosecutor
may invoke § 1005-5-3.2(1) which recognizes as an aggravating factor the fact that "the defend-
ant's conduct caused or threatened serious harm." This factor would raise Harris' sentence (on
an attempted aggravated battery conviction) from 1-3 years to 5-10 years. See ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-8-2(5) (Supp. 1977).
71. If, for example, the actor's purpose were to demolish a building and, knowing and believ-
ing that persons in the building would be killed in the explosion, the actor nonetheless deton-
ated a bomb, there would be an attempt to kill even though it was no part of the actor's
purpose-i.e., he did not consciously desire-that the building's inhabitant's should be killed.
MODEL PENAL CODE 501.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10 1960).
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however, it is probable that the fact finder will be able to infer the intent
necessary to sustain an attempted murder conviction. In close cases, involv-
ing a high degree of uncertainty and conflicting testimony, 72 the jurors will
now be given unambiguous instructions upon which to base their decision.
CONCLUSION
Besides redefining the mental state required to sustain a conviction of
attempted murder, Harris promotes clarity of analysis by eliminating the
presumed intent language which has cluttered so many opinions in the at-
tempted murder area. Prosecutors are now on notice that nothing less than
carefully drafted indictments and instructions requiring intent to kill will
withstand judicial review. Most importantly, criminal defendants accused of
attempted murder will be afforded greater protection of the law.
Nancy Lea Barrett
In such a case as the above hypothetical, it is likely that a jury would find the defendant had
an intent to kill, despite his argument that he only wished to destroy the building. Note,
however, that the conduct described above should not be called a "reckless disregard of human
life" in the attempt situation, to avoid the presumed intent problem. See notes 11-12 and ac-
companying text supra.
72. The facts of Shields and Harris appear to fall into this category. Cf. People v. White, 7
Ill. App. 3d 1074, 288 N.E.2d 705 (1st Dist. 1975). (This case involved a shooting incident in
which the defendant was charged with attempted murder and aggravated battery. The signifi-
cant fact in the defendant's acquittal of the attempted murder charge was that, although he was
a Viet Nam veteran with expertise as a sharpshooter, he inflicted only non-fatal wounds on the
victim (i.e., in the foot) despite firing at close range).
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